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ABSTRACT 
The material account claims that indicative conditionals are material. However, the 
conventional wisdom even among material account enthusiasts is that the material account 
cannot be extended to subjunctive conditionals. There are mainly three reasons that motivate 
this consensus: (1) the belief that if subjunctives were material, most subjunctive conditionals 
would be vacuously true, which is implausible; (2) its inconsistency with Adam pairs, which 
suggest that indicative and subjunctive conditionals have different truth conditions; and (3) 
the belief that it is an inferior hypothesis compared to the possible world theories. I will argue 
against (1) that the counterintuitive aspects of vacuously true conditionals can be explained 
away in a uniform fashion, regardless of whether they are indicatives or subjunctives. I 
reinforce this assumption by showing that the positive arguments for the material account of 
indicatives are also intuitively valid for subjunctives. The point mentioned in (2) is resisted 
by explaining Adam pairs as logically equivalent conditionals that can be appropriate at 
different times, depending of the speaker’s epistemic situation. Finally, (3) is criticised by 
making the case that the possible world account faces insurmountable problems and that a 
full-blown material account of indicatives and subjunctives is overall a more elegant solution. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 A conditional is a sentence composed by a subordinate clause, usually accompanied by the 
term ‘if’, that indicates the condition for the occurrence of the main clause. Two examples of 
conditionals are ‘If it rains there will be a flood in the city’ and ‘If it had rained, there would 
be a flood in the city’. Conditional sentences are usually classified according to the 
grammatical mood of the verbs. When the verbs are presented in the indicative mood, the 
conditional is called ‘indicative’; while if there are in the subjunctive mood, they are called 
‘subjunctive’. The examples mentioned above are respectively of an indicative conditional 
and a subjunctive conditional . 1
The material account of indicatives states that indicative conditional sentences and the 
material conditional have the same truth conditions. It is an elegant explanation, but it has 
 I will make a distinction between indicative and subjunctive conditionals, instead of a distinction between 1
indicative and counterfactuals, because the latter terminology wrongly suggests that any indicative conditional 
with a false antecedent is a counterfactual, which would render the distinction between counterfactuals and 
indicatives pointless (Lowe, 1995: 42). Moreover, there are clear examples of conditionals with true antecedents 
which would be routinely classified as counterfactuals, e.g., ‘I think she took arsenic; for she has symptoms X, 
Y, and Z, and these are just the symptoms she would have if she had taken arsenic’ (Anderson, 1951: 37). The 
indicative vs subjunctives terminology is also not completely accurate since the ‘subjunctive’ in subjunctive 
conditionals involve additional layers of past tense morphology. The indicative ‘If Roman is at the post office 
now, he is missing the meeting’ becomes the subjunctive ‘If Roman had been at the post office now, he would 
have been missing the meeting.’ Thus, one could argue subjunctives could be called ‘additional past 
conditionals’ (von Fintel, 2012: 466–467). However, I will stick to the indicatives/subjunctives terminology 
because it is easier to grasp, it is already widely accepted and it reliably allow us to recognise visible 
grammatical features such as the use of ‘would’ in the main clause and a past tense in the ‘if’-clause.
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some counter-intuitive aspects, e.g., it implies that any indicative conditional with a false 
antecedent or a true consequent is vacuously true. Despite these problems, the material 
account found many defenders that attempted to explain away its counter-intuitive aspects as 
resulting from the confusion between pragmatic elements of the natural language and logic 
(or semantic) elements . 2
One would expect that the material account would be naturally extended to subjunctive 
conditionals. However, the consensus in the literature  is that subjunctive conditionals cannot 3
be material. Interestingly though, even proponents of the material account express a sceptical 
attitude regarding this possibility . I will argue that this consensus is unfounded. In the 4
sections 2, 3 and 4 I make the case that material theorists must adopt the material account of 
subjunctives for the sake of coherence. In the section 5, I argue that the examples that 
motivate the belief that indicative and subjunctive conditionals have different truth conditions 
are not convincing. In the section 6, I argue that possible world theories have too many 
problems to be considered the default position about the subject and at least cannot be 
considered superior to the material account from the get-go.   
2. FOR THE SAKE OF COHERENCE  
One of the main reasons that lead us to the prevailing idea that subjunctives are not material 
is that it does not do justice to our modal intuitions about subjunctive conditionals. A material 
conditional is true when its antecedent is false, but since the vast majority of subjunctive 
conditionals are asserted under the assumption that their antecedents are false, if they were 
material it would follow that the vast majority of subjunctive conditionals are vacuously true. 
This is implausible, since many subjunctive conditionals with false antecedents seem false. In 
fact, two subjunctive conditionals can have false antecedents even if only one of them is 
intuitively true. For instance, given usual conditions and the fact that it was not raining, the 
conditional ‘If it was raining, the street would be wet’ is intuitively true, while the conditional 
‘If it was raining, the planet earth would be invaded by Martians’ is intuitively false. 
However, if we accept that subjunctives are material, we cannot make these distinctions, for 
both of them are true solely due to the falsity of the antecedent. 
The first thing that is important to observe is that this line of reasoning can be questioned 
using the same line of reasoning that material account theorists already employ regarding 
indicative conditionals with false antecedents. A large number of indicative conditionals have 
false antecedents, but any material account proponent would admit that: (1) those indicative 
conditionals are vacuously true, (2) their counter-intuitive aspects can be explained away by 
pragmatic means, and (3) the fact that they are in large numbers is irrelevant to the question. 
If these answers can be plausible in this case, they will also be plausible if most subjunctive 
conditionals are vacuously true. The fact that there are even more vacuously true subjunctives 
than vacuously true indicatives does not affect the strength of the argument. 
 Ajdukiewicz (1956), Allott & Uchida (2009a; 2009b), Clark (1971), Hanson (1991), Lewis (1976), Grice 2
(1989), Jackson (1987, 2006), Mellor (1993), Noh (1998); Rieger (2006; 2015); Smith (1983) and Smith & 
Smith (1988). 
 To my knowledge, the only exception is Strawson, who argues that the ‘view that ‘if . . . then . . .’ is identical 3
in conventional force with ‘. . . ⊃  . . .’ is sometimes accompanied by reservations about counter-factual 
conditionals. But if it is to be attractive, I think it will have to be forced through for counterfactuals as 
well’ (Strawson, 1986: 229).
  Lewis (1973); Jackson (1987: 72–85); Rieger (2013: 3164).4
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As a matter of fact, the item (2)–the fact material account theorists attempt to explain 
away the counter-intuitive aspects of indicative conditionals by pragmatic means–ensures that 
a material account of subjunctives is inevitable for any defence of the material account due to 
a question of coherence. After all, all the intuitions that motivate the belief that subjunctive 
conditionals are not material are the same that motivate the belief that indicative conditionals 
are not material. For instance, a subjunctive conditional such as ‘If today were Thursday, the 
Martians would invade our planet’, will be vacuously true according to the material account 
if the antecedent is false, but its counter-intuitiveness can be explained by the same pragmatic 
resources used with indicatives. Paul Grice  could explain the counter-intuitive aspect of this 5
subjunctive in the following way: the conditional is counter-intuitive because it is 
conversationally inappropriate, since the assertion of a conditional conveys a conversational 
implicature that the speaker has indirect, or non-truth-functional, evidence for the proposition 
asserted. Since one would only assert this subjunctive due to the falsity of its antecedent, she 
would implicate a false implicature, thus being conversationally inappropriate. Therefore, the 
subjunctive conditional is counter-intuitive because it is not conversationally appropriate.  
Frank Jackson tried a different approach that can also be applied to subjunctives. He 
argued that the assertion of a conditional conveys a conventional implicature that the 
probability of the consequent given that the antecedent is high . In this case, this means that 6
by asserting a subjunctive conditional, the speaker implicates that the conditional is robust in 
relation to its antecedent, i.e., that the probability of the conditional asserted would remain 
high if the antecedent turn out to be true, or to put in other words, that the conditional could 
be employed on a modus ponens. The subjunctive conditional only seems false because it is 
accompanied by a false implicature. If it turns out that I was wrong about today’s date, and in 
fact it is Thursday, I would not conclude by modus ponens that the Martians will invade our 
planet. Rather, I would abandon the conditional. The fact that the conditional is a subjunctive 
in this case does not change the rationale behind the explanation.  
My favourite account explains the counter-intuitive character of the example as a result of 
a contextual fallacy . The relevant conditions to evaluate the truth value of a conditional 7
involve the actual truth values of the antecedent and the consequent. If the antecedent is false, 
the conditional is vacuously true. Our modal intuition tends to ignore this basic fact, because 
it conceives a possible circumstance in which the antecedent is true in order to evaluate the 
truth value of the conditional, even if the antecedent is actually false. This is as contextual 
fallacy, because in order to determine the truth value of a conditional, the modal intuition 
ignores the actual truth values of its components. If the modal intuition is unjustified when 
the subject matter is indicative conditionals, there are no reasons to accept it when the subject 
matter is subjunctive conditionals.  
 Grice (1989).5
 Jackson (1987).6
 Allott & Uchida (2009a; 2009b).7
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The only explanation that deviates from this pattern is the one provided by Rieger . He 8
argued that in order for A → B  to be conversationally appropriate, the following conditions 9
must be met: 
I. S knows A ⊃ B 
II. S does not know A, and does not know ¬A  
III. S does not know B, and does not know ¬B.  
The first condition observes the requirement that knowledge is a norm of assertion. The 
second and the third are motivated by the idea that we ordinarily assert A → B only if the 
truth values of A and B are epistemically open . Now, with this explanation we could explain 10
why some indicatives are counter-intuitive, e.g., ‘If today is Thursday, the Martians will 
invade our planet’. The problem, though, is that this solution would imply that most 
subjunctive conditionals are inappropriately asserted since they usually involve the 
knowledge that A is false and so is B. Thus, not only counter-intuitive subjunctives, but also 
intuitive ones such as ‘If today were Thursday, tomorrow would be Friday’, would be 
rendered inappropriate. Therefore, this solution cannot be extended to subjunctive 
conditionals.  
However, I think that this restriction is a consequence of the problems of this approach. It 
seems that Rieger’s solution offers conditions of assertibility for conditionals motivated only 
by regular ‘if A, B’ constructions. Since these expressions implicitly suggest that the speaker 
does not know the truth values of A and B, it is natural to think that they would not be proper 
to assert otherwise. But this line of reasoning gives too much importance to regular ‘if’ 
constructions when in reality the terms employed on the subordinate clause of a conditional 
can vary according to the speakers’ assumptions and different contexts. Once we understand 
this fact, it is hard to ignore that examples that violate II and III abound. A conditional such as 
‘Since she got late to the airport, she lost the airplane’ is conversationally appropriate, even 
though the speaker asserts the conditional under the assumption that both the antecedent and 
the consequent are true. Why? Because the speaker is using a term that adequately express 
 Rieger (2006; 2015).8
  Here ‘→’ stands for indicative conditionals, ‘⊃’ stands for material conditional and ‘⊨’ stands for entailment. 9
All argumentative forms and metalogical principles discussed will be initially named, and from then on will be 
referred by their respective abbreviations. Some of the known argumentative forms will be introduced only by 
their names and their logical form will not be introduced. For simplicity of exposition, I will use the same 
numeration (1,2,3…) for each positive argument and the capital letters A, B, C…. for both sentence letters and 
propositional variables—the context will make it clear which one is being used. I will not use quotes to 
highlight the use-mention distinction when there is no risk of confusion, and the symbols and variables quoted 
will be modified to ensure that the notation remains uniform.
 Rieger (2006: 234). Rieger says that his theory is Gricean in spirit, but Grice’s solution grounds the 10
assertability of a conditional in the implicature of indirectness it conveys, i.e., in the implicature that the speaker 
believes she has indirect, or non-truth-functional evidence to accept the conditional that is asserted. The fact that 
one has truth-functional evidence to accept a conditional is not inconsistent with the fact that she also has 
indirect evidence on top of it. If this implicature of indirectness is true, the conditional is assertable, even if the 
speaker knows the truth values of its propositional components. If this implicature of indirectness is false, the 
conditional is unassertable, even if the speaker ignores the truth values of its propositional components. Rieger’s 
position is more plausibly classified in the same lines of Ajdukiewicz’s (1956).    
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her knowledge about the truth value of the constituents involved. There are many other 
suitable terms such as ‘Given that A, B’, ‘B, because A’, ‘When A, B’, ‘Despite A, B’, etc .  11
But this solution also faces counter-examples with regular ‘ifs’ in contexts that is 
implicitly obvious to interlocutors what are the speaker’s assumptions. In these cases, the 
regular ‘if’ does not need to be flexed according to the speaker’s assumptions. Consider 
Dutchman conditionals such as ‘If John is a great artist, I’m Einstein’. These conditionals are 
asserted under the assumption that both the antecedent and the consequent are false, but are 
perfectly appropriate. Rieger’s solution also faces problems in trying to explain the following 
conditional: ‘If Messi waits just a second longer, he scores on that play’ . Conditionals of 12
this sort are common in sportscast play-by-play commentary, but are appropriate even if the 
speaker already knows that both antecedent and consequent are false. Other circumstances 
that will potentially be problematic for Rieger’s solution are lectures. Suppose that in a 
lecture of Kripke’s thesis about the necessity of identity a teacher asserts the following 
conditional, ‘If water is H2O, then it is necessarily H2O’. He asserts the conditional knowing 
the truth values of the antecedent and consequent of the conditional, but he is not being 
inappropriate in any way. Or consider a mathematics’ teacher that presents an informal proof 
that there are infinite prime numbers with two conditionals: If there is a N which is the 
biggest prime number, there is a prime number bigger than N. If there is a N which is the 
biggest prime number, there is no prime number bigger than N. Therefore, there is no N 
which is the biggest prime number . The conditionals are asserted under the assumption that 13
there is no N which is the biggest prime number, but they are appropriate. Also notice that 
these conditionals are part of a more general pattern in which two conditionals A → B and A 
→ ¬B can be employed together in reductio arguments that show that A is false. None of 
these facts are compatible with Rieger’s solution . 14
Another problem of this approach to assertability is that it predicts that any conditional 
that occurs in an instance of modus ponens and modus tollens are inappropriate. Consider the 
following instance of modus ponens: ‘If you’re late, you can’t take the bus. You are late. 
Therefore, you can’t take the bus’. This seems implausible. Rieger anticipated this objection 
by arguing that these examples are special cases that should be expected in a Gricean 
approach. Other special cases in which a conditional is assertable although II and III are not 
satisfied are artificial conditionals based on a Bridge convention, ‘If I have a red king, I also 
have a black king’, and even-ifs, e.g., ‘Even if you offer me a huge pay rise, I shall resign’ . 15
But this seems a cop-out to avoid the issue. If the requirements do not apply in these 
cases, what reason is there to interpret these examples as special cases instead of just counter-
 ‘Even-ifs’ admit a similar explanation, although the term can signal different things about the speaker’s 11
expectations in different contexts. In an example such as ‘Even if you offer me a huge pay rise, I shall resign’, it 
expresses the speaker’s belief that he will resign despite the offer, i.e., his confidence in the truth of the 
consequent is independent of the antecedent. But the ‘even’ particle could be dispensed altogether if the context 
is enough to understand the speaker’s beliefs, e.g., ‘If he was surprised, he didn’t show’ (Grice, 1989: 62). In 
some cases, ‘even’ can signal that the consequent is unexpected given the antecedent, e.g., ‘Even being older, 
she is still attractive’. The verbal modifications characteristic of subjunctive conditionals admit a similar 
explanation, since conditionals with the form ‘If A were/had been the case, B would be the case’ express the 
speaker’s belief that the antecedent and consequent of the conditional are false, unless the opposite it is 
indicated by the context.  
 Fintel (2012: 467).12
 Jackson (1987: 53).13
 Other possible contexts that will be problematic for this solution includes guessing games and testimonies, but 14
I will not discuss these contexts for lack of space.
 Rieger (2015: 254–255).15
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examples? Is an instance of modus ponens to be interpreted as a special circumstance or as a 
basic use that should be predicted? The other examples mentioned above suggest that these 
cases are not rare. If the solution should be applied only to cases where the knowledge of the 
truth values of A and B are relevant to the assertability of A → B, then this is not a general 
theory of assertability, but a particular observation that only applies to these particular cases. 
A proper theory of assertability of conditionals is not to be arbitrarily restricted to a few 
cases, but should have the generality necessary to be applied to a vast range of examples and 
circumstances where the assertability of conditionals take place .   16
Thus, the fact that this approach cannot be extended to subjunctives should not be seen as 
problem, since it already makes too many wrong predictions with indicative conditionals to 
begin with. As a matter of fact, the very idea that a theory of assertability of indicative 
conditionals must not be applied to subjunctive conditionals seems implausible and should be 
received with scepticism, since verbal modifications should not have this impact on our rules 
of appropriate conversation and certainly do not have any impact so as far as disjunctions and 
conjunctions are concerned.  
Perhaps the fact that subjunctive conditionals misleadingly suggest that the speaker is 
considering a context in which the antecedent is true explains why the resistance against the 
material account is even stronger with subjunctives than indicatives. It would not be an 
exaggeration to suggest that the mistakes committed by the critics of the material account are 
also committed by the material account theorists when subjunctive conditionals are 
concerned. 
3. THE POSITIVE ARGUMENTS 
The positive arguments that imply the material account of indicative conditionals are also 
intuitively valid for subjunctive conditionals. Take an instance of (Or-to-If), which is 
intuitively valid for indicative conditionals, such as ‘Either the butler is the killer or the 
gardener is the killer. Hence, if the butler is not the killer, the gardener is the killer’ . This 17
argumentative form implies the material account of indicatives as follows : 18
Curiously, similar instances are also intuitively valid for subjunctive conditionals, for 
instance, ‘If any stranger had approached, the dog would have barked. Therefore, no stranger 
approached, or the dog would have barked’ , and ‘If Napoleon were not a conqueror, he 19
Prem (1) ¬A v B ⊨ A → B (Or-to-If)
Prem (2) A ⊃ B ≡ ¬A v B given the truth conditions of  ‘⊃’
1,2 (3) A ⊃ B ⊨ A → B 1,2 transitivity of entailment
Sup (4) A → B ⊨ A ⊃ B given the validity of modus ponens for ‘→’
1, 4 (5) A → B ≡ A ⊃ B 3,4 mutual entailment
 Notice that despite Rieger’s claim to a Gricean heritage, Grice’s solution does not face any of the problems 16
mentioned above. In the contexts involving the game of Bridge, ‘even-if’ and Dutchman conditional examples, 
the relevant evidence is truth-functional, not indirect. The other examples involving conditionals in teaching and 
modus ponens instances are not a problem for Grice, since they do not convey a false implicature of 
indirectness.  
 Stalnaker (1975: 269).17
 Rieger (2012: 6). The argument is attributed to Stalnaker (1968: 269).18
 Anscombe (1981: 203).19
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would have died young. Therefore, Napoleon would have been a conqueror, or else have died 
young’ . 20
Instances of Exportation (EXP), the argumentative principle that allow us to infer A → (B 
→ C) from (A&B) → C, plausibly apply to indicative conditionals, as it is evidenced by the 
following example: ‘If he is a man and he is married, then he is a husband. Therefore, if he is 
a man, then if he is married, he is a husband’ . We can show that conditionals are material 21
assuming ex contradictione quodlibet (ECQ) A,¬A ⊨ B, conditional proof (CP), the meta-
logical principle that states that if A ⊨ B, then A → B is a tautology and (EXP). The argument 
is as follows: 
 (EXP) can also be used in a slightly different argument that employs (E&) instead of (ECQ): 
Now, being a central principle for the material account, the validity of (EXP) for subjunctive 
conditionals would mean that subjunctives are material. This is exactly what is suggested by 
intuitive instances of (EXP) with subjunctives such as the following: ‘If Juan hadn't married 
Xochitl and Sylvia hadn't run off to India, Juan and Sylvia would have become lovers. 
Therefore, If Juan hadn't married Xochitl, then if Sylvia hadn't run off to India, Juan and 
Sylvia would have become lovers , and ‘If John were in and Tom were out, Father’d be left 22
alone. Thus, if John were in then if Tom were out, Father'd be left alone’ . 23
Another important argumentative form is (U-to-if), that principle that from the acceptance 
that every F is G allow us to infer that Fa → Ga . This can be used in a positive argument 24
for the material account since the only way that the falsity of Fa → Ga could imply the 
falsity of every F is G is by having a true antecedent and a false consequent. Rieger presents 
the following intuitive instance of this principle: Given that everyone studying French is 
studying German and Anna is one of the students, we can infer that if Anna is studying 
French, then she is studying German. Now, a similar conclusion could be inferred in the 
subjunctive mood, namely, if Anna had studied French, she would have studied German. 
Two of the previous arguments employed (CP). This principle can also be used to show 
that conditionals obey conditional negation (CN), i.e., the principle that A → B is logically 
Prem (1) A&¬A ⊨ B (ECQ)
1 (2) (A&¬A) → B 1, (CP)
1 (3) ¬A → (A → B) 2, (EXP)
1 (4) ¬A ⊨ A → B 3, (CP)
Prem (1) B&A ⊨ B (E&)
1 (2) ⊨ (B&A) → B 1, (CP)
1 (3) ⊨ B → (A → B) 2, (EXP)
1 (4) B ⊨ A → B 3, (CP)
 Anscombe (1981: 205).20
 Leavitt (1972: 10).21
 McGee (1985: 466–467).22
 Anscombe (1981: 203).23
 Rieger (2013: 3166–7). Sanford (2003: 48–49) also presented a similar argument, which he attributes to 24
Frege. Barker (1997) presents a similar argument, but formulated it in terms of assertability.
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equivalent to ¬(A&¬B). The argument that allows us to derive (CN) with (CP) also involves 
(E&), (MP), (I&), and reduction to absurdity (I¬) :  25
  
What is important is that (CP) is intuitively valid whether the conditional in question is 
indicative or subjunctive. If A entails B, then it is a logical truth that if A is the case, B is the 
case (indicative) or that if A had been the case, B would have been the case (subjunctive). For 
instance, if the proposition that Socrates is Athenian entails the proposition that Socrates is 
Greek, then it is a logical truth that ‘if Socrates is Athenian, he is Greek’, and ‘If Socrates 
were Athenian, he would have been Greek’. Again, the fact that the conditional is in a 
different grammatical mode makes no difference from a semantic point of view. The same 
could be said about (CN). It is also intuitively valid for subjunctives: ‘If John were in, James 
would not’ is equivalent to ‘It is not the case that John would be in and James not’ . 26
Another important principle is General Conditional Proof (GCP), which states that if A, B 
entails C, it follows that A entails B → C. Rieger–correctly to my view–uses the following 
example to claim that this principle is intuitively valid: given that having eggs and olive oil 
entails that I can make mayonnaise, it follows that having eggs entails that if I have olive oil I 
can make mayonnaise . Now, (GCP) could be used to show that A ⊃  B and A → B are 27
logically equivalent. First, we need to show that A → B entails A ⊃  B. This conclusion 
follows from the assumption that (MP) is valid for ‘→’. If the entailment of A → B and A to 
B were to fail, there would be an A and a B for which A → B is true, but A ⊃ B is false. But if 
A were true and B false, we would be able to infer by (MP) that for ‘→’ that B is true, which 
is a contradiction . Now we need to show that A ⊃ B entails A → B. We know that A ⊃ B, A 28
⊨ B, since it is uncontroversial that (MP) is valid for ‘⊃’. From (GCP) it follows that A ⊃ B ⊨ 
A → B . Thus, (GCP) implies that conditionals are material. What is interesting is that the 29
intuitive instance of (GCP) involving indicative conditionals is intuitively valid when the 
Prem (1) A → B
Sup (2) A&¬B assumption
2 (3) A 2, (E&)
1,2 (4) B 1,3 (MP)
2 (5) ¬B 2, (E&)
1,2 (6) B&¬B 4,5 (I&)
1 (7) ¬(A&¬B) 2–6, (I¬)
Prem (1) ¬(A&¬B)
Sup (2) A assumption
Sup (3) ¬B assumption
2,3 (4) A&¬B 2,3 (I&)
1,2,3 (5) ¬(A&¬B) & (A&¬B) 1,4 (I&)
1,2 (6) B 3,5 (I¬)
1 (7) A → B 2,6 (CP)
 Hanson (1991: 54).25
 Anscombe (1981: 203).26
 Rieger (2013: 3164).27
 Rieger (2013: 3163).28
 Rieger (2013: 3163). The original formulation of the argument was presented Clark (1971: 34–35).29
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indicative conditional in the conclusion is replaced by a subjunctive conditional: ‘If having 
eggs and olive oil entails that I can make mayonnaise, it follows that if I had olive oil, I could 
have made mayonnaise’.   
These examples suggest that if the positive arguments imply that indicative conditionals 
are material, they also imply that subjunctive conditionals are material, since the same 
fundamental principles are also valid for subjunctive conditionals. As simple as it is, this 
reasoning is still meet with resistance. Rieger, for instance, argued that (GCP) fails for 
subjunctives, since the evaluation of subjunctives involves a hypothetical assumption of the 
antecedent that represents an alternative way things could have been, thus putting in risk the 
background information necessary to make the inference . Consider the intuitive instance of 30
(GCP): if having eggs and olive oil entails that I can make mayonnaise, it follows that having 
eggs entails that if I have olive oil I can make mayonnaise. 
Rieger thinks that this inference will not work with a subjunctive conditional in the 
conclusion since the hypothetical assumption that I have olive oil may direct me to a scenario 
in which I may not have eggs, which is required to make mayonnaise. However, there is no 
context in which the premise, ‘I have eggs’, is true, and the conclusion ‘if I had olive oil, I 
could make mayonnaise’, is false. That would only occur if we change the context during the 
evaluation of the argument, but this is a contextual fallacy that can render any argumentative 
form invalid. It is a basic tenet of semantics that when evaluating arguments for validity we 
need to maintain the context constant . That this tenet must be observed is attested by the 31
fact that a plausible instance of modus ponens will be rendered invalid by changing the 
context: 
If it’s raining, the streets are wet. It’s raining.  
Therefore, the streets are wet.  
If the premises’ truth values are evaluated on Wednesday and the conclusion on Thursday, the 
premises could be true and the conclusion false . It is not surprising then that one of the main 32
explanations for the counter-examples to modus ponens presented in the literature  is that 33
they result from an illicit context in the evaluation of the argument . But there is no need to 34
defend modus ponens in order to highlight the importance of holding the contextual features 
fixed. The same point can be made with uncontroversial argumentative forms such as 
conjunctive elimination. Consider the following example: 
It’s raining and the streets are wet. 
Therefore, the streets are wet. 
This argumentative form could be said to be invalid if we evaluate the premise’s truth value 
on Wednesday and the conclusion’s on Thursday. That won’t do. Thus, Rieger’s objection to 
(GCP) does not hold water. 
 Rieger (2013: 3164–5).30
 Allott & Uchida (2009a; 2009b); Brogaard & Salerno (2008); Gauker (2005: 94); Kaplan (1989).31
 Brogaard & Salerno (2008: 40–41).32
 McGee (1985); Lycan (1999).33
 Sinnott-Armstrong (1999).34
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One could object that the examples above do not involve contextual shift since the actual 
propositional content has temporal indexers. Thus, if the premise is intended to refer streets 
on Wednesday, the premise should be interpreted as ‘It’s raining and the streets are wet on 
Wednesday’, and this would entail ‘The streets are wet on Wednesday’. The attempt to shift 
the context in order to make the conclusion false will be ineffective with this qualification 
since the truth values of the propositions will not vary across time. Of course, in order to fully 
determine the proposition expressed by the sentences we would need to expand it with other 
unarticulated constituents, e.g., what is the name of street that was wet, in which city? It was 
raining on a Wednesday, but in which year and what was the local time? However, even a 
partial elucidation of the propositional content is enough to block any contextual shift.  
But if this qualification is made, then there are no contextual shifts against (GCP) either. 
If the premise ‘I have eggs’ needs to be expanded to include its unarticulated constituents, for 
instance, ‘I have eggs at the time t, in the place x’, then the conclusion would be ‘if I had 
olive oil at the time t, in the place x, I could make mayonnaise at the time t, in the place x‘. 
Thus, there would be no counter-examples to (GCP) with subjunctive conditionals. 
Surprisingly, this platitude about the importance of maintaining the context fixed also 
enable us to block the main counter-examples to the material account. The counter-examples 
to contraposition, strengthening the antecedent and hypothetical syllogism with indicative 
conditionals  and subjunctive conditionals  are usually perceived as an indisputable proof 35 36
that the material account of indicatives and subjunctives are false. They are not known as 
conditional fallacies for nothing. However, these counter-examples involving indicatives  37
and subjunctive conditionals  are disarmed if the context is kept fixed. Thus, the solution for 38
Rieger’s objection against (GCP) contains the element for a powerful argument for the 
material account of both indicatives and subjunctives. Everything falls into place. 
4. THE MATERIAL ACCOUNT MUST BE UNIFORM 
A sound methodological principle is that a plausible logical system should explain closely 
related phenomena by the same fundamental principles . The material account satisfies this 39
requirement with ease, since it is a particular case of the same semantics used for other logic 
operators, such as disjunction, conjunction and negation. It does not matter what is the 
operator, the truth-functional thinking is the same.  
 In fact, the same logic applies whether the operator in question is in the indicative or 
subjunctive mood. In virtue of grammatical habits, we will rarely find a free-standing 
conjunction with subjunctive clauses, but they occur just as naturally as antecedents of 
conditionals, e.g., ‘If John were in and Tom were out, Father’d be alone’; or consequents, 
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 Lewis (1973).36
 Allott & Uchida (2009a; 2009b); Chakraborti (1998: 498–501); Lycan (1999: 133–136).37
 Brogaard & Salerno (2008); Lowe (1995: 56–57). The same strategy is also used in specific cases by different 38
authors, for instance, Edgington (1995: 254) defends hypothetical syllogism for indicatives with this argument. 
Sinnott-Armostrong, Moor & Fogelin (1990: 10–14) articulate a similar defence of the validity of modus tollens 
for indicatives, while Sinnott-Armostrong (1999: 129) explains the counter-examples against strengthening of 
the antecedent and modus ponens for indicatives as contextual fallacies. McDermott (2004: 346–347) use the 
same strategy in defence of strengthening of the antecedent for subjunctives, and Read (1992: 7) accepts a 
similar explanation for one particular counter-example involving a classical inferential form with quantifiers.
 Ellis (1984: 50–51).39
!10
e.g., ‘If Father had made a will, Jim and Michael would have been disinherited’ . The same 40
could be said about the rarity of free-standing disjunctions with subjunctive clauses, but that 
can also occur naturally in consequents of conditionals, e.g., ‘If there were a meat shortage, 
then either prices would not be low or there’d be governmental control’ . Moreover, notice 41
that ‘If there were a meat shortage, then either prices would not be low or there’d be 
governmental control’ is intuitively equivalent to ‘If there were a meat shortage, then if meat 
prices were low there’d be governmental control’ . This reinforces the material account for 42
subjunctives since the disjunction in the consequent of the first proposition is logically 
equivalent to the conditional in the consequent of the second proposition. The first 
proposition has the logical form A → (¬B ⋁ C), which is logically equivalent to A → (B → 
C) due to the application of (OTF).  
 One could object that (OTF) is not a valid argumentative form for subjunctive 
conditionals in alternatives to the material account. For instance, in a popular version of the 
possible world account, A → B is only true if B is true in the closest A-world . But from a 43
disjunction such as ‘Oswald killed Kennedy or someone else did it’ we cannot infer ‘If 
Oswald had not killed Kennedy someone else would have’, for in the actual world the 
disjunction is true, since Oswald killed Kennedy, but the conclusion is false since in the most 
similar world Oswald would have not killed Kennedy and no one else would have. However, 
it could be objected that the argumentative form involving subjunctives is intuitively valid if 
the disjunction is properly formulated in the subjunctive mode, namely, ‘Either Oswald killed 
Kennedy or someone else would have’, and from which it follows that ‘If Oswald had not 
killed Kennedy someone else would have’. Besides, it could be objected that the counter-
example commits a contextual fallacy since the disjunction relies on the fact that Oswald 
killed Kennedy, but the conditional is evaluated in a context where Oswald did not kill 
Kennedy. The context is illicitly shifted because the truth values of the disjunction are 
determined in the actual world, but the truth values of the conditional are determined in the 
closest world in which the antecedent is true.  
 It is also important to observe that these examples represent a problem for the possible 
world account, since this hypothesis receives considerable intuitive support from subjunctive 
conditionals especially due to their subjunctive clauses. But here we have examples of 
conjunctions and disjunctions with subjunctive clauses and yet no one would say that the 
subjunctive conjunctions require a possible world semantics. If there are no good reasons to 
provide a possible world semantics as a fundamental principle for disjunctions or 
conjunctions, then there are no good reasons to provide the same semantics for conditionals.  
 The fact that the possible world account treats conditionals as a sui generis operator 
should be considered a hindrance. A similar objection could be raised against suppositional 
theorists, which claim that conditionals are not propositions, but conditional assertions of the 
consequent given the assumption of the antecedent . It does not seem likely that only 44
conditionals among the logic operators would lack truth values. If there are no reasons to 
think that logic operators such as ‘or’ or ‘and’ should have different truth conditions in 
different grammatical moods, why should ‘if’ be any different? The idea that a verbal 
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modification should require an entirely different logic reflects the excessive importance 
attributed to certain intuitions regarding ‘if’. A full-fledged material account that incorporates 
both indicative and subjunctive conditionals has none of these problems and ensures that our 
logic principles are uniform by providing the same truth conditions for ‘and’, ‘not’, ‘or’ and 
‘if’. 
 If possible world theories do not offer a uniform explanation of closely related 
phenomena, suppositional theories do it even less since they treat conditionals as conditional 
assertion acts instead of propositions with truth conditions. This implies, among other things, 
that conditionals cannot be embedded. Lewis objects that this consequence would require too 
much work and that it disregards the knowledge we already have about the phenomenon:  
I have no conclusive objection to the hypothesis that indicative conditionals are non-truth-
valued sentences …. I have an inconclusive objection, however: the hypothesis requires 
too much of a fresh start. It burdens us with too much work still to be done, and wastes 
too much that has been done already. … We think we know how the truth conditions for 
compound sentences of various kinds are determined by the truth conditions of 
constituent subsentences, but this knowledge would be useless if any of those 
subsentences lacked truth conditions. Either we need new semantic rules for many 
familiar connectives and operators when applied to indicative conditionals—perhaps rules 
of truth, perhaps special rules of assertability like the rule for conditionals themselves—or 
else we need to explain away all seeming examples of compound sentences with 
conditional constituents .      45
It is implausible that only conditionals among the connectives should not be embeddable. It’s 
a drastic revisionary hypothesis that goes against our explanation of closely related 
phenomena. The same thing could be said about the conclusion that conditionals lack truth 
conditions. It seems a drastic hypothesis that goes against the way we explain the semantics 
of logic operators. If the operators ‘or’, ‘and’ and ‘not’ have truth conditions, why should 
conditionals be singled out from the group as an exceptional case? This hypothesis only 
works by isolating conditionals from other connectives. The inferences with disjunction and 
conjunction are severed and we are left with half truth-functional logic (‘not’, ‘or’, ‘and’) and 
half revisionary semantics. The material account, on the other hand, remains uniform. It does 
not ‘waste what we know’ about the other operators, and it is close to its connective partners. 
If conjunctions and disjunctions are truth function of two propositions, so are conditionals. 
The semantics must be an account universally applicable to every connective. Treating 
conditionals as sui generis operators are a step backwards compared to the truth functional 
thinking. We need a uniform account of connectives, but the only way to achieve that is by 
accepting a full-fledged material account that includes both indicatives and subjunctives.   
5. THE APARTHEID THESIS 
An independent reason to think that the material account cannot be extended to subjunctives 
is the belief that indicative and subjunctive conditionals have different truth conditions, also 
 Lewis (1976: 305).45
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known as the Apartheid thesis. This thesis is supported by the widely held belief that 
indicative conditionals concern how things are, while subjunctive conditionals concern an 
alternative way things could have been, or in other words, indicative conditionals are about 
the actual world, while subjunctive conditionals are about other possible worlds. Jackson 
argued for this assumption with the following example. Suppose that the weather is nice and 
there are no signs of rain, but we know that the match will be cancelled if it rains and that it 
won’t be cancelled if it doesn’t rain. Suppose further that you have the following beliefs 
about the way things will actually be: it won’t rain and the match will happen. Now, given 
these assumptions, consider the following pair of conditionals:   
If it rains, things will be different from the way they will actually be. 
If it were to rain, things would be different from the way they will actually be.  
But while (2) seems acceptable, (1) is odd. Rather, one should have said that ‘If it rains, 
things will be as they actually will be’. Jackson’s reasoning is that this example not only 
shows that indicatives and subjunctives have different truth conditions, but also that 
subjunctives can take us from the actual world .  46
Here is a couple of things in reply. First, it could be argued that the real pair of (1) is not 
(2), but (2'): 
(2') If it were to rain, things would be different from the way things actually would have 
been. 
(2') is just as counter-intuitive as (1), because the use of the auxiliaries ‘will’ and ‘would’ do 
not express the speaker’s beliefs adequately, while (2) is intuitive for the opposite reason. 
Jackson ignores this point because he changes the mood of the other auxiliaries—he 
introduces ‘were’ in the antecedent and replaces ‘will’ with ‘would’, while maintaining the 
indicative mood of the auxiliary that accompanies the actuality clause. However, a similar 
trick could be used to modify (1) into a proper sentence (1'): 
(1') If it rains, things will be different from the way they would actually be.  
This sentence could be interpreted as stating that if it rains, things will be different from the 
way the speaker thought they would actually be, which is perfectly reasonable.  
It could also be objected that because the use of the auxiliaries does not properly express 
the speaker’s beliefs, (1) shouldn’t be deemed as apparently false, but ungrammatical. The 
recognition that an indicative sentence is poorly formed just shows that its formulation is 
inadequate. It doesn’t have any logical relevance. 
Another recurrent argument for the Apartheid thesis is the Adam pair:  
 (1a) If Oswald did not kill Kennedy, someone else did.  
 (2a) If Oswald had not killed Kennedy, someone else would have.  
 Jackson (1987: 74–75).46
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 Intuitively, these conditionals have different truth conditions. After all, to accept (1a) is 
enough to know that Kennedy was killed by someone, but to accept (2a) is necessary to 
assume a conspiracy theory regarding its murder . 47
These arguments, however, face many objections. It is arguable that the example of 
Kennedy’s killer is only plausible if we confuse conditionals’ truth conditions with the 
reasons one has to accept them. The reasons to accept an indicative conditional and its 
subjunctive version can be distinct even if they have the same truth conditions. Suppose that 
Fred and Mark have different reasons to think that John went to the bookstore on Wednesday 
afternoon. Fred thinks that John went to the bookstore because he knows that John goes to the 
bookstore on every Wednesday afternoon. Mark thinks that John went to the bookstore 
because he suspects that John has an affair with a client who goes to the bookstore every 
Wednesday afternoon. These reasons do not affect the conditions in which the proposition 
‘John went to the bookstore Wednesday afternoon’ is true or false. We should not confuse our 
claims about what is unacceptable or acceptable with claims about what is true, since the first 
relies on the evidence available to the epistemic agent about the proposition, but the second 
relies on the truth conditions of the proposition at hand. To think otherwise would amount to 
a confusion between epistemic and semantic phenomena. 
 However, one could object that it is precisely because the truth conditions cannot be 
determined by epistemic elements that we should expect that the subjunctive conditional of 
the pair could be accepted by the same reasons of its indicative version. Nevertheless, this is 
not what happens, since in every possible circumstance the subjunctive ‘If Oswald had not 
killed Kennedy, someone else would have’ is only plausible given the acceptance of a 
conspiracy theory.  
One way to placate this criticism is to observe that (1a) and (2a) only seem to have 
different truth conditions if we disregard the contextual assumptions in which they should be 
evaluated. If both are evaluated under the same assumptions, they will have the same truth 
conditions. It is not difficult to imagine a context in which (1a) and (2a) would be acceptable 
under the same conspiracy theory. The only difference between the two is that (2a) would be 
asserted given the assumption that Oswald was the killer, while (1a) would be more 
appropriate to assert if Oswald is just the main suspect. The problem, however, is to imagine 
a plausible context in which (1a) and (2a) can be interpreted as involving only the 
assumptions that Kennedy was killed by someone and that Oswald is the main suspect. (2a) 
resists this interpretation, since it seems to involve two assumptions, i.e., that Kennedy was 
killed by Oswald and that he would be killed even if Oswald was not the killer.  
This resistance probably results from our linguistic habits of interpreting subjunctive 
conditionals as being asserted under the assumption that the antecedent is false. Since the 
antecedent of (2a) involves the proposition that Oswald did not kill Kennedy, and the 
antecedent is assumed as false, but not (1a), their contextual assumptions seem to be distinct. 
This becomes clear if we consider that if this assumption were to be cancelled, both will 
admit the same non-conspiratorial interpretation. For instance, ‘If Oswald didn’t kill 
Kennedy, someone else did. In fact, this was precisely what happened. He was killed by 
another person‘ and ‘If Oswald had not killed Kennedy, someone else would have. In fact, 
that was exactly what happened. He was killed by another person’. In this case, both 
propositions admit the same interpretation that involves the perpetrator of the crime. This 
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answer, however, does not eliminate the problem completely, since it makes the non-
conspiratorial interpretation of (2a) acceptable only if the antecedent and the consequent were 
taken as true, i.e., only if under the assumptions that someone different from Oswald killed 
Kennedy. (1a) admits a non-conspiratorial interpretation even if we wouldn’t have decided 
about the identity of Kennedy’s assassin.  
One way to bypass this difficulty is to maintain that we have the right to ignore as an 
illusion the interpretation that the antecedent of (2a) is considered as false when we are 
considering both conditionals under the same contextual assumptions. If this looks strange, it 
is because it contradicts our linguistic habits. This strategy, however, is inadequate. If the 
truth conditions of conditionals are independent of speakers’ contextual assumptions, the idea 
that we should maintain the contextual assumptions unchanged to maintain the equivalence 
between (1a) and (2a) is mistaken.  
Someone could insist then that we should incorporate the contextual assumptions implicit 
in each conditional in their propositional content. If (1a) involve only the assumptions that 
Kennedy was killed by someone and that Oswald is the main suspect, then (2a) must involve 
the same assumptions. Thus, (2a) must be interpreted as (2a)* ‘If Oswald wasn’t the one who 
killed Kennedy, then someone else was’. Thus, if (1a) is interpreted as an attribution of 
identity, its corresponding pair is (2a)* not (2a) . This strategy seems plausible, but faces 48
some difficulties. Consider the following conditional: 
(3a) If Oswald does not kill Kennedy, someone else will.    
 If (1a) is logically equivalent to (2a), so it is (3a). But it is not obvious how an attribution of 
identity could fit in accord with (3a). The conspiracy reading seems natural in this case, but 
not the attribution of identity reading. In fact, (3a) involves a slightly different assumption 
from (2a) since (2a) requires a conspiracy reading and the assumption that Oswald killed 
Kennedy, while (3a) requires only the conspiracy reading. Besides, this solution blurs the 
distinction between speakers’ contextual assumptions involved in the acceptance of (1a) and 
(2a), and the propositional content of (1a) and (2a). 
 Lowe used a similar approach, but arguing that it is (1a), and not (2a), that is poorly 
formulated. He argued the real pair of (2a) is another indicative with an auxiliary ‘will’, 
namely, ‘If Oswald has not killed Kennedy, then someone else will have’. Since both have the 
same consequent directed towards the future, and both are acceptable or not in the same 
circumstances, the problem would be solved . But this solution only postpones the problem, 49
for it raises the question of what would be the subjunctive corresponding to the indicative 
without the auxiliary. If (1a) has no subjunctive pair, an explanation for this absence must be 
provided. In a similar line of reasoning, Ellis argued that the real indicative pair of (2a) is 
(3a) , but this raises the question of why there are no proper subjunctive pairs of (1a). This 50
solution could not be successful unless this explanation is provided and it does not sound 
likely that any such explanation could be provided. 
 I think these approaches are not in the right direction because they neglect the main issue, 
namely, that (1a), (2a) and (3a) are made true by the same event, i.e., Kennedy’s murder, 
regardless of whether or not there is a conspiracy. In fact, it is arguable that both conditionals 
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are just different ways of referring the same facts, but that can be appropriate in different 
moments, depending of the speaker’s epistemic situation. For instance, an indicative 
conditional asserted today such as ‘If it rains tomorrow, the match will be cancelled’, is 
intuitively equivalent to a subjunctive conditional asserted tomorrow about the same event, 
i.e., ‘If had rained, the match would be cancelled’ . The same explanation holds for the 51
Kennedy’s killer conditionals. The indicative ‘If Oswald didn’t kill Kennedy, someone else 
did’ and the subjunctive ‘If Oswald had not killed Kennedy, someone else would have’ are 
both typically asserted in different moments, even if they have the same truth conditions. 
Thus, the only difference is that each grammatical mode is appropriate in different moments. 
That is the reason why (2a) only admit a conspiracy reading, because it reflects this 
assumption. 
However, these differences have no logical significance, since the link between indicative 
and subjunctive conditionals is just a consequence of a more general principle about truth 
value links. The principle states that a proposition expressed by ‘An event of the type K is 
occurring’ asserted in the present has the same truth conditions of the proposition expressed 
by ‘An event of the type K occurred one year ago’ asserted one year afterwards . We have 52
independent reasons to think that way. This becomes clear when we consider non-conditional 
propositions, for instance:   
(1b) Someone killed Kennedy on November 22, 1963. 
(2b) Someone would kill Kennedy on November 22, 1963. 
The reasons to accept (1b) can be the news that Kennedy was killed on November 22, 1963. 
However, the reasons to accept (2b) can be the belief that someone would kill Kennedy on 
November 22, 1963. However, it is implausible to think that the truth conditions of (1b) are 
distinct from (2b), since they are both made true by the occurrence of the same event, the 
killing of J. F. Kennedy on Dallas, November 22, 1963. 
The different modes and tenses of conditionals express the speaker’s epistemic situation, 
not the truth conditions of conditionals. Thus, it is not just (1a)-(2a), but also (3a) can be 
logically equivalent:  
(1a) If Oswald didn’t kill Kennedy, someone else did.  
(2a) If Oswald had not killed Kennedy, someone else would have. 
(3a) If Oswald doesn’t kill Kennedy, someone else will. 
The propositional constituents of each conditional are more complex than the one presented 
in (1a)-(3a), since they involve specific contextual elements. If we include these contextual 
elements in its formulation, we will obtain a conditional that is independent of the speaker’s 
epistemic situation in its formulation:  
(4a) If Oswald is not Kennedy’s killer on November 22, 1963, someone else is Kennedy’s 
killer on November 22, 1963.  
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(1a)-(3a) are logically equivalent to (4a). The truth conditions of (4a) are independent of the 
fact that the grammatical modes of (1a)-(3a) are appropriate in different contexts, given the 
speaker’s epistemic situation.  
This suggests that the truth conditions of conditionals are independent of their 
grammatical modes (indicative and subjunctive), and independent of the different expressions 
employed in the antecedent and consequent, and their auxiliaries (‘if’, ‘had’, ‘were’, ‘will’, 
‘would’, etc.), since they are just extra-propositional constituents used to express the 
speaker’s assumptions during the assertion. The Kennedy examples seem logically different 
only because we are induced by these grammatical elements to confuse speaker’s 
assumptions (an epistemic element) with the truth conditions of a conditional (a semantic 
element). 
That these extra-propositional constituents have a role in expressing speakers’ assumption 
become evident when we compare its use in questions. Suppose that someone asks the 
question: ‘John did not go, did he?’ We can infer from this question that he believes that John 
did not go. On the other hand, if he asks the same question in a slightly different way ‘Surely 
John went, didn’t he?’, then we can infer that he believes that John did go. If John did go, the 
correct answer to both questions is ‘yes’, even if the first question was asked under the 
expectation that the answer would be ‘no’, while if he did not go, the correct answer to both 
questions will be ‘no’, even if the second question expects a ‘yes’ as answer. In the same way, 
suppose that we are considering John’s chances on a competition. The assertion of ‘If he 
entered, he won’ is equivalent to ‘If he enters, he will win’ and ‘If he had entered, he would 
have won’. The only difference is that the last assertion suggests that the speaker thinks that 
John didn’t enter. This doesn’t imply, however, that the subjunctive version demands a 
different logical treatment, for the same reasons that the different suggestions associated with 
the two versions of the same question doesn’t require a distinct logical treatment . 53
 This link of truth values is also supported by the way we employ the indirect discourse 
about indicative conditionals. For instance, about the conditional ‘the meetings will be held 
indoors if it rains’ someone could say, ‘he said that the meetings would be held indoors if it 
rained’ . We don’t think that the indicative conditional has a different truth condition when is 54
reported as a subjunctive conditional by another person. Rather, it would be make more sense 
to think that the subjunctive just reflects the speaker’s epistemic situation regarding the 
conditional. 
 Despite its plausibility, this explanation faces criticisms. The argument that (1a)-(3a) 
express the same conditional in distinct moments presuppose that the moments must be the 
ones suggested by the argumentation, i.e., (1a)-(2a) are both asserted after the murder, while 
(3a) must be asserted before the murder. However, it is arguable that they can be asserted in 
distinct moments of time, since conditionals can have different temporal directions. A 
subjunctive conditional can be about the present, e.g., ‘If Her Majesty had been here now she 
would have been revolted’, or about the future, e.g., ‘If the auditors had come tomorrow they 
would have found everything in order’ . These examples eliminate any hope that we can 55
determine the epistemic situation of the speaker from the tense or grammatical mode of the 
conditional sentence alone.  
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 In response to this objection, we could observe that despite the temporal flexibility of 
indicative and subjunctives in general, in the examples mentioned we have restrictions that 
justify our interpretation. (1a) and (2a) can only be plausibly interpreted as being about a 
moment in the past before the killing took place, while (3a) can only be plausibly interpreted 
as referring the same event in the future and before any killing had taken place. In any case, 
even if both had plausible alternative interpretations of (1a)-(3a), this would not affect the 
argumentation. All we need to maintain is that (1a)-(3a) are logically equivalent, even if they 
can assume different grammatical modes when they are asserted in distinct moments. If due 
to the temporal flexibility of conditionals (1a)-(3a) could be plausibly asserted in the same 
moment, but with distinct grammatical modes, this would only reinforce the idea that they are 
logically equivalent. 
Another objection involves some possible reasons to accept (3a). Suppose that (1a) and 
(3a) are equivalent, but appropriate in distinct moments. This temporal thesis also implies 
that the proposition ‘Someone will kill Kennedy’ is logically indiscernible from ‘Someone 
killed Kennedy’, being the only difference between the two propositions that the first says 
about the future what the last says about the past. (1a) is entailed by the fact that someone 
killed Kennedy. However, a conspirator could accept that Oswald plans to kill Kennedy 
without any help from a second killer, thus accepting ‘Someone will murder Kennedy’, but 
without accepting (3a) .  56
To answer this objection, it is important to observe first that the assumption of the 
conspirator is not just that someone will kill Kennedy, but the more specific assumption that 
Oswald will kill Kennedy. In this case, the conspirator refuses to accept that ‘If Oswald does 
not kill Kenned, someone else will kill him’ from the assumption that ‘Oswald will kill 
Kennedy’. This resistance, however, involves a refusal of the material account, i.e., the 
conspirator doesn’t accept that the conditional A → B can be true simply because A is false. 
There are many ways of dealing with this contrary intuition. The conspirator thinks that 
the conditional ‘If Oswald does not kill Kennedy, someone else will kill him’ is false, because 
she assumes that if Kennedy were not killed by Oswald, it would not be killed by anybody 
else. However, this reasoning is incoherent, because it assumes that Oswald is the only killer 
and at the same time it refuses the conditional for considering a scenario in which Oswald is 
not the killer. It is also arguable that the objection involves another incoherence, since it 
admits that (1a) is entailed by the falsity of the antecedent, i.e., by the fact that Oswald killed 
Kennedy, or by the truth of the consequent, i.e., if Kennedy’s killer was not Oswald. In fact, 
this argument is generally presented as evidence favourable to the material account . 57
Therefore, it would be incoherent to accept this consequence, but then insist that they are 
inconsistent with our pre-theoretical beliefs. This discussion suggests that the only way to 
maintain the coherence of our temporal intuitions is to accept the material account. 
 Another accusation against the thesis that indicative and subjunctive conditionals are 
appropriate in different contexts given the speaker’s epistemic situation is that they are 
incompatible with the way we use the indirect discourse. Suppose someone said (1d) ‘I’m 
awake’. The indirect reference of (1d) will be (2d) ‘X said that she was awake’. Now 
consider the following propositions: 
(1b) Someone killed Kennedy on November 22, 1963. 
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(3b) Someone kills Kennedy on November 22, 1963. 
(4b) Someone will kill Kennedy on November 22, 1963. 
According to the temporal thesis, we should have said that what (1b) says about the past is 
exactly what (4b) says about the future and what (3b) says about the present. However, this is 
inconsistent with the way we use the indirect discourse, since we could say in the present 
about (4b) the following (5b) ‘X said that someone killed Kennedy on November 22, 1963’. 
This description of what X said is false, because X didn’t have in mind an event that had 
occurred, but an event that would occur. If we adopt the same objection with respect to 
conditionals, the equivalence between (1a), (2a) and (3a) is put at risk . An immediate reply 58
is to observe that the correct reference to (4b) would be ‘X said that someone would kill 
Kennedy on November 22, 1963’. Dudman, however, insists that the occurrence of ‘will’ in 
this case has the function of placing Kennedy’s killer in the future, just as the world ‘killed’ 
place the killer in the past . 59
The argument, however, must be criticised by a different route. Note that when we say ‘X 
said the she was awake’, we flex the verb to express our epistemic situation (i.e., the fact that 
we are referring to the past) and not to express the epistemic situation of the quoted speaker 
(i.e., the fact that he is referring to the present). In other words, we are referring to the 
speaker’s assertion in (1d) as if she had said something about the past, but we know that she 
was saying something about her present. If this is acceptable in this case, it will be also 
acceptable in (5b). Moreover, it is also arguable that we can adopt a distinct manner of 
making the indirect speech that would not involve any counter-intuitive aspects. For instance, 
we can replace (2d) with (2d’): X said, ‘I’m awake’. We can also replace (5b) with (5b’): X 
said, ‘Someone will kill Kennedy on 22 November, 1963’. 
Thus, to sum up: there are not reasons to think that indicatives and subjunctives have 
different truth conditions. The Adam pair can be proper explained as a pair of conditionals 
that are appropriate in different contexts, given each speaker’s epistemic situation, but they 
are made true by the same facts. Ellis eloquently express the irrelevance of their difference in 
mood in the following passage: 
The distinction [between indicatives and subjunctives] is one of mood. In many natural 
languages (I am assured most) in which the distinction is made at all it is made in this 
way, i.e. by verbal modification. But verbal modifications, such as those involved in 
changes of tense or mood, do not normally alter the character of sentential connectives. 
‘Or’ and ‘and’ have the same significance whatever the tense or mood of the sentences 
they connect. Consequently, we should not expect an indicative ‘if’ to be any different 
from a subjunctive ‘if’. (…) The difference between subjunctive and indicative 
conditionals should be more superficial than this-more like the difference between ‘is’ 
and ‘was’, say, than between ‘is’ and ‘must be’. Fundamentally, logically, they should be 
the same, apart from the specific implications of tense and mood . 60
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 Indeed. Since verbal modifications have not logical significance with other connectives, they 
should not affect the truth conditions of conditionals either. The Apartheid thesis is 
unjustified.   
   
6. POSSIBLE WORLD THEORIES 
Another reason why the material account of subjunctives is still dismissed out of hand is the 
popularity of possible world theories that are taylor-made to accommodate some of our 
modal intuitions about subjunctive conditionals. For instance, Stalnaker offers an alternative 
in which to establish the truth value of A → B we need to consider the possible world that is 
most similar or closest to the actual world in which A is true, to then consider if B is true in 
that world. A conditional is true only if B is true in this possible world, otherwise, is false . If 61
the closest A-world is the actual world, then we consider if B is true in the actual world. If A 
is a necessarily false proposition, the conditional is vacuously true . 62
 These truth conditions allow us to explain why some subjunctive conditionals with false 
antecedents are more plausible than others. This hypothesis predicts in accordance with our 
modal intuitions that the conditional ‘If it was raining, the street would be wet’ would be true, 
since in the closest world in which is raining, the street would be wet; whereas the 
conditional ‘If it was raining, the planet would be invaded by Martians’ would be false, since 
in the closest world in which is raining, the planet would not be invaded by Martians. If the 
possible world account can accommodate our modal intuitions regarding subjunctives so 
elegantly, no wonder that a material account that is ridden with counter-intuitive aspects is so 
promptly ignored. From the point of view of the critics, a material account of subjunctives 
would at best inherit the legion of problems that the material account of indicatives already 
has. It would not be worth the trouble. However, possible world theories also have many 
problems that should be properly considered before any decision is made about the 
supposedly demerits of the material account of subjunctives.  
 First, it is important to consider that possible world theories also have its own counter-
intuitive aspects, since they work as a particular case of the material account in the world 
selected by the evaluation of a conditional’s truth value. In other worlds, when the antecedent 
is true, a truth-functional calculus is still used in order to establish the truth values of the 
conditional. If in the closest A-world, B is true, then A → B will be true even if A and B are 
unrelated to one another. If there are no possible worlds in which A is true or B is false, A → 
B is vacuously true. These counter-intuitive aspects can hardly be perceived as an 
improvement over the material account. The fact that the same counter-intuitive aspects of 
the material account are now accompanied by a semantics that is considerably more 
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complicated and dissociated from the truth conditions of other connectives (disjunctions and 
conjunctions are still material), does not make this hypothesis any more promising. Possible 
world theories are at a disadvantage in comparison to the material account, since they have 
many of its defects in new clothing, but none of its qualities, such as simplicity and logical 
uniformity.   
The idea that possible world theories capture our modal intuitions in all cases turn out to 
be an exaggeration on a closer look. These theories are fundamentally unequipped to explain 
the truth conditions of Dutchman conditionals, i.e., conditionals that are incompatible with 
the truth of the antecedent. The conditional ‘If John’s speaking the truth, I’m a Dutchman’ is 
accepted under the assumption that John is lying, but in the closest world in which John is 
speaking the truth, I’m not a Dutchman. Possible world theories predict that every Dutchman 
conditional is false, but there is no independent reason to accept this prediction. Again, the 
material account has the upper hand, since it can accommodate with ease these cases: 
Dutchman conditionals are true when they have false antecedents.  
Possible world theories can also be accused of being motivated by an illusion associated 
with the logical form of conditionals. We are naturally inclined to confuse the truth conditions 
of A → B with the inferential jumps suggested by its logical form. Since the propositional 
form of A → B suggests that B can be inferred from the assumption of A, it is natural to think 
that A → B is true when B is true in the closest A-world. That this is a confusion becomes 
clear when we consider that other propositional forms, e.g., ¬A ∨  B, can have the same 
inferential jumps of A → B, but do not cause in us the same modal intuitions. The reason is 
that unlike A → B, the logical form of ¬A ∨ B does not suggest any inferential jump from A 
to B, even though they do have the same inferential jumps–see the table bellow: 
If the truth of ¬A ∨ B doesn’t require an evaluation of the closest A-world, then the truth of A 
→ B doesn’t require an evaluation of the closest A-world. The only reason to think that 
conditionals are any different is its misleading grammatical and logical form, which suggests 
that its truth is determined by an inferential jump from one of its constituent propositions to 
the other. 
It is important to observe that one of the main reasons for the popularity of possible world 
theories also contains its fair share of fundamental problems. Possible world theories are 
known for their expressive power, since apparently they allow us to freely navigate in a vast 
ocean of possible worlds in order to verify the satisfaction of different patterns. Given their 
enormous expressive power, conditionals are routinely used to represent metaphysical 
principles, epistemic relations, causal chains, empirical regularities, etc. This makes it natural 
to assume that the truth value of each conditional must be determined by the satisfaction of 
the pattern expressed by it. If these patterns can be satisfied in circumstances that are not 
actual, or can fail to manifest themselves in the actual word, possible world semantics are 
needed to track these patterns in other worlds. Possible world theories seem to be a perfect 
A → B ¬A ∨ B
modus ponens disjunctive syllogism
If Oswald did not kill Kennedy, someone else did. 
Oswald did not kill Kennedy. 
Thus, someone else killed Kennedy.
Either Oswald killed Kennedy, or someone else 
did. 
Oswald did not kill Kennedy. 
Thus, someone else killed Kennedy.
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marriage between the expressive power of conditionals and our corresponding modal 
intuitions attached to it.  
 However, this expressive power of possible world theories is their main strength but also 
their main weakness, since they will make logic hostage to different modal intuitions that are 
in constant conflict and pulling in different directions. In order to understand that, we need to 
consider a few things first. It is obvious that possible world proponents can’t afford the 
satisfaction of every single modal intuition, so they stick with one of them at the expense of 
the others. This in turn generates criticisms. The vanilla possible world semantics states that 
A → B is true iff the closest A-world is a B-world . Notice that these theories seem 63
appropriate for conditionals that express causal relations, by allowing us to determine 
whether the conditional is true even if the antecedent is false. For instance, the truth value of 
the conditional ‘If this match is struck, it will light’ can be determined in the closest possible 
world that the antecedent is true, even if the antecedent is false in the actual world. If in the 
closest world in which the match is struck it lights, the conditional is true; otherwise, is false. 
Thus, it becomes possible to test or verify whether the pattern expressed by the conditional 
would realise in the proper circumstances by means of an alternate.  
So far so good. The problem starts when the pattern is satisfied in many other possible 
worlds. Possible world theories seem incapable of satisfying our intuitions about tautological 
conditionals that are true by definition, i.e., conditionals such as ‘If that figure is rectangular 
and equal-sided, then it is a square’ and ‘If today is Tuesday, then tomorrow isn’t Friday’. The 
idea that we need to check the closest antecedent-world to determine whether the consequent 
is true seems completely off, because it treats tautological conditionals as contingent 
conditionals.  
One could expect then that the semantics must be fine-tuned to fit the stronger or weaker 
patterns of each conditional. Since tautological conditionals express a conceptual necessity 
that is not ensured only the closest worlds, the possible world should be modified 
accordingly. Thus, for instance, it could be argued that the conditional A → B is true iff B is 
true in all A-worlds, not the closest A-worlds. But this would be not enough and subsequent 
modifications would be needed if the relations would involve impossibilities, e.g., the 
conditional ‘If 16 were divisible by 9, it would be divisible by 3’ intuitively express a 
conceptual necessity, but there is no possible world in which 16 is divisible by 9. Hence, 
another semantics would be needed to include impossible worlds. 
It could also be argued that the semantics should be modified to fit in our modal intuitions 
in epistemology. Thus, some modal intuitions in the analysis of knowledge led some 
philosophers to demand a different possible world theory. Vanilla possible world theories 
imply that any conditional with true antecedent and consequent are true, but these truth 
conditions cannot do justice to Nozick’s analysis of knowledge. Nozick employs new clauses 
as substitutes for justification in an analysis of knowledge. His explanation is that a subject S 
knows a proposition P iff: 
(1) P is true. 
(2) S believes that P. 
(3) If P weren’t true, S wouldn’t believe that P. 
(4) If P were true, S would believe that P. 
 Or iff all the closest A-worlds are B-worlds, if you choose Lewis over Stalnaker.63
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The element (3) is introduced in the definition to block Gettier’s counter-examples, since in 
these cases S’s belief that P is not sensitive to the truth of P, especially if S would still believe 
that P even if P were false. S knows that P if her belief in P is safe, i.e., if her belief could not 
easily be false .  64
In the usual possible world theories, (4) is entailed by (1) and (2). We can consider (3) 
and (4) independently of the truth values of its components, but the only way to do that is to 
assume that their truth conditions must be distinct. Nozick argues that the truth of the 
conditional (3) must involve not the closest P-world, since this would be the actual world, but 
an appropriate range of possible worlds close to that one in which P is true. S will know P if 
an appropriate range of possible worlds close to that one in which P is true, S believes it. 
Only in this way can we do justice to (3) and explore the consequences of maintaining the 
truth of P, while changing other things . In other words, the use of possible world semantics 65
implies that a whole new logic must be designed to fit in Nozick’s intuitions about the nature 
of knowledge. 
Thus, the initial suggestion that possible world theories should allow us to track a pattern 
across a suitable range of possible worlds end up in the Babylonian conclusion that we need 
to develop as many versions as there are different modal intuitions and patterns expressed by 
conditionals. This rationale, naturally, can only be satisfied at the expenses of logic’s 
generality and practicality, since the entire logic edifice will become hostage to the patterns a 
single conditional sentence will eventually express. It seems absurd that we should choose 
between different logics before formalising a conditional sentence in the same way one can 
choose between different clothes before going out, but that is what the pattern ‘follow modal 
intuition then build a new possible world semantic’ ask of us. We shouldn’t choose three 
different types of logic because we are evaluating two examples of tautological conditionals 
or discussing epistemology. In the eagerness to do justice to our modal intuitions, the task of 
determining the truth conditions of conditionals was hijacked by other theoretical interests 
that goes beyond the task of expressing the truth conditions of conditionals. 
Another problem that should not be ignored is that we should make a distinction between 
the ability of possible world semantics to track different patterns across possible worlds and 
the ability to express our modal intuitions about these patterns. While the second task seems 
at least in principle feasible, the first is doomed to fail from the beginning, because it is 
circular. In order to determine if we should accept or refuse a conditional A → B, we consider 
what are the available reasons to accept it. The vanilla possible world account, however, 
suggests that we should do something different, namely, to consider whether B would true in 
the closest A-world. This explanation, however, inverts the order of acceptance, for we are 
only able to decide whether B would be true in the closest A-world if we already have reasons 
to accept it in the first place. The same criticism can be extended to its use as a tool to track 
patterns: it only allows us to track different patterns whose distribution in the modal universe 
we already assume. Thus, the possible world semantics only allows us to express some of our 
modal intuitions. 
The utility of the possible world account is also prey to criticisms. Let’s take tautological 
conditionals, for instance. The idea that you need to consider every possible world to 
determine the truth of a tautological conditional seems farfetched, since these conditionals are 
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true by definition and we can recognise their truth by their logical form alone. We do not 
consider any possible worlds at all in ascertaining its truth . Thus, it is implausible that we 66
would need a possible world semantics to express its related modal intuitions.  
There are other grievances that allow us to question the ability of the possible world 
account even if they should be understood in this limited role. The fact that the paragons of 
the possible world account openly admit that they are only ‘modest realist’, that different 
ways of determining the similarity relation are context dependent, and that the truth 
conditions for subjunctives have great potential for indeterminacy, does not sound reassuring. 
In fact, the truth conditions of a conditional in a possible world account are not only context 
dependent, but subjective. In a possible world theory, A → B is true if B is true at the closest 
A-world (or at all the closest A-worlds), but the problem is that ‘closest A-world’ is just a 
synonymous with ‘belief system updated by the hypothetical addition of A’. This is not 
surprising since these truth conditions were motivated by the Ramsey’s test, which states that 
in order to accept A → B we add A (hypothetically) to our system of beliefs, make whatever 
adjustments are required to maintain consistency without modifying the hypothetical belief in 
A, and consider whether or not B is true. The point is that claiming that A → B is true if B is 
true in the closest A-world is just a different way of saying that A → B is true if B is true in 
my system of beliefs updated by the hypothetical addition of A. But since different 
individuals will have different belief systems, the truth value of a given conditional will be 
relative to each belief system. A similar criticism is that the possible world approach only 
provides acceptability conditions that will vary according to speaker’s beliefs about which 
world is closer . This implies that the expression of modal intuitions allowed by the possible 67
world account is marred by the threat of subjectivism.  
And this is just one of a long list of problems that includes irreducible disputes about 
particular conditionals  and the consequence that most ordinary subjunctives are false . The 68 69
list is too extensive to discuss in detail here, but it serves to reinforce the point that the utility 
of possible world accounts is far from obvious. Moreover, the prospectus of subjunctive 
conditionals either having subjective truth values, or most of them being false, could be 
hardly considered an improvement over most subjunctives being vacuously true, as it is 
implied by the material account. At least the material account provides a simple and austere 
semantics.  
5. CONCLUSION 
I argued that the main reasons to think that subjunctive conditionals are not material are 
unjustified. The modal intuitions associated with subjunctive conditionals are no different 
from the ones associated with indicative conditionals. If the latest ones can be explained 
away by pragmatic means, the same could be said about the first ones. The truth-functional 
theorist cannot deny this consequence without being incoherent. Besides, the principles that 
entail the material account are still valid when they employ subjunctive conditionals. This 
shows that the thesis that subjunctive conditionals are material and the thesis that indicative 
conditionals are material are intertwined. You can’t accept that indicative conditionals are 
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material without accepting that subjunctive conditionals are material. If the last hypothesis is 
indefensible, so is the first one. Conversely, if the first hypothesis is plausible, so is the last 
one.  
I also criticised the prevailing reasons to deny the viability of material account of 
subjunctives, which includes both the examples that motivate the Apartheid thesis, and the 
possible world theories. And while a knockdown argument that settles the discussion about 
these questions is not something that seems likely in philosophy, I believe I have at least 
presented a plausible argument for the thought that they could be overcome by the material 
account alternatives.  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